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Abstract	  
 
This dissertation explores the concepts of beauty and value - particularly aesthetic value - with special 
attention paid to beauty in relation to modernism and modernist music. Although beauty is, generally 
speaking, not often regarded as an important aspect of modernism, I hope to show that this is a 
misconception, and that beauty can in fact be located within modernist music and art.  Beauty, I 
believe, is not a physical quality which can be objectively assessed but is instead subjective, and only 
ever present within experience and the relationship of subject and object. This distinction between the 
two main points of view regarding beauty is something that I will address within the course of this 
thesis. I will question whether or not the subjective/objective divide hinders the recognition of beauty 
in modernism, and shall consider whether or not these two opposing views are equally valid and, if so, 
how they might be combined. Furthermore, the relevance and significance of aesthetic value – the 
value of l’art pour l’art – can at times be called into question due to the fact that l’art pour l’art is, by 
definition, not a means to any end and is therefore ‘quite useless’.1 I will discuss the idea of art for art’s 
sake, in addition to considering other ways in which art may be valued. Finally, I will turn to 
modernism itself and consider why many people find it so difficult to locate beauty in modernism 
 
Beauty is a concept which has occupied philosophers and thinkers for centuries and, as this is the case, 
I have selected the works of only a few key figures to refer to. Ideas about beauty have changed and 
evolved over time therefore I have chosen to take a broad approach when selecting readings in an 
attempt to show the wide range of ideas about beauty. The philosophers I have selected span from 
Plato up until the present day, and show the breadth of the discussion of beauty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Oscar	  Wilde,	  The	  Picture	  of	  Dorian	  Gray,	  first	  published	  1891	  (This	  ed.	  Penguin	  Classics,	  2003),	  p.	  4	  
	   3	  
Contents           
 
Introduction            4 
 
Chapter 1 – Beauty          14 
  
  - What is Beauty?        14 
  - Beauty in Modernist Music and Art      21 
 
Chapter 2 – Value          26 
 
  - Values of Art         26 
  - The Value of Beauty and Aesthetic Value     28 
 
Chapter 3 - Changing Attitudes Towards Modernist Music     31 
 
  - Beauty and Value in Modernist Music     31 
  - Modernism Becomes Familiar       34 
  
Conclusion            36 
 
Bibliography            40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   4	  
Introduction           
 
The Question of Beauty 
 
The subject of beauty is a major philosophical question which many people have attempted to address 
over the centuries. As this is the case, I shall only attempt to address a small area within this topic, 
specifically the question of whether beauty can be located within modernist music and art, or whether 
beauty, as a central element in artistic creation and aesthetic appreciation, is a thing of the past. In 
order to determine this, it is first important to form an understanding of pre-modernist ideas about 
beauty and to consider how traditional notions of beauty have evolved, before it will be possible to 
identify where, if anywhere, beauty can be located within modernism. In this dissertation I will discuss 
the idea of beauty - what beauty is, and the value attached to beauty – but I shall also consider 
modernism, and beauty in relation to modernism. In addition to this I will take a closer look at the 
concept of value and our reasons for valuing beauty, music, and beauty in music.  
 
Generally speaking, there are two main points of view when it comes to the question of beauty: that of 
beauty as subjective, and therefore personal and linked to experience; and that of beauty as an 
objective quality belonging to objects, which is not dependent on personal taste. These opposing views 
dominate thinking on this topic; however, while they are both valid and can be argued convincingly, I 
believe that it may be useful to find a way to think beyond these existing ideas and, perhaps, even find 
a way to combine them in such a way that they can be reconciled with each other. 
 
In her introduction to Venus in Exile: The Rejection of Beauty in 20th Century Art Wendy Steiner writes that 
‘In modernism, the perennial rewards of aesthetic experience – pleasure, insight, empathy – were 
largely withheld, and its generous aim, beauty, was abandoned’.2 However, I will argue that beauty is 
indeed present within modernist art and music, and that although the ‘rewards of aesthetic 
experience’ may be found through a seemingly less direct route, they are nonetheless there, waiting to 
be discovered by those with minds open enough to allow it. Furthermore, the suggestion that 
modernism withholds the experience of insight is one that I cannot agree with, therefore I hope to 
show that modernist art is often highly insightful and relevant to a particular time or culture. If we are 
open to the suggestion that there has evolved a different kind of beauty, then it may be possible to 
overcome the common cultural supposition that beauty is no longer an end point in modernist art and 
music, and to reclaim beauty in the 20th and 21st centuries. Georges Braque is quoted by Steiner as 
having said - in 1910 - that what he aimed to do, and felt that he must do, was to ‘create a new sort of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Wendy	  Steiner,	  Venus	  in	  Exile:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Beauty	  in	  20th	  Century	  Art,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  XV	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beauty’, a beauty that appeared to him ‘in terms of volume, of line, of mass, of weight, and through 
that beauty interpret my subjective impression… I want to expose the Absolute, and not merely the 
factitious…’3. Braque’s acknowledgement of the possibility of the existence of new and different types 
of beauty is highly significant and will be a key point for consideration within this discussion. His 
attempt to create a new sort of beauty indicates that beauty was in fact not, as Steiner suggests, 
abandoned, but that it remained ‘the generous aim’ of aesthetic experience in modernist art. 
 
 
Beauty all Around Us 
 
In our day-to-day lives it is often easy to describe things as beautiful – beauty, some would say, is all 
around us if we look hard enough. As John Cage has observed, ‘Beauty is now underfoot wherever we 
take the trouble to look.’4 The word ‘beautiful’ can be applied to many things: days; people; buildings; 
images; sounds; flowers; landscapes; clothes; music – to the music of Vivaldi, Beethoven, Stravinsky or 
Schoenberg - the list goes on, but what is it that makes all of these things ‘beautiful’? What is it that 
links them in this way?  There appears to me to be no quality that could be common to each of these 
things – other than perhaps their ability to affect the way we feel in one way or another - yet they can 
all be described using the same word, so, what does it mean to be beautiful? If beauty was to be 
located within an object it makes sense to expect all beautiful objects to share some common attribute, 
however as this is not the case, beauty must be located outside the object itself, and so the question 
now is what is beauty and what does the word ‘beauty’ actually mean?  
 
 
Glenn Parsons expresses this question in his essay on beauty and public policy thus: 
 
‘When we say ‘this is beautiful’, what are we saying? One simple and intuitive 
answer is that we are simply expressing a liking or preference for the thing in 
question. So saying ‘that dress is beautiful’ equates to ‘I like that dress’. This 
answer to our question gains plausibility from the great diversity of things that 
people call beautiful: dresses, faces, sunsets, cars, paintings, songs, scientific 
theories, chess moves, and so on. What could all of these very different things 
have in common, except the fact that in each case, the speaker likes that thing? 
The beautiful dress has a striking colour, but the chess move has no colour at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Georges	  Braque	  as	  quoted	  in	  Wendy	  Steiner,	  Venus	  in	  Exile:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Beauty	  in	  20th	  Century	  Art,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002),	  p.44	  4	  John	  Cage,	  quoted	  in	  Michael	  Kimmelman,	  ‘Clowning	  Inventively	  with	  Stuff	  of	  Beauty’,	  New	  York	  Times,	  September	  19,	  1997,	  accessed	  via	  http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/19/arts/art-­‐review-­‐clowning-­‐inventively-­‐with-­‐stuff-­‐of-­‐beauty.html	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all; the beautiful song has a catchy melody, but the beautiful sunset is silent; 
and so forth. Thus, we seem to be left with only the positive feeling of the 
speaker — a liking — as the only common element that makes them all 
beautiful.’5  
 
 
Parsons’ problem with this answer is that it is too simple. Equating beauty with liking is not a 
satisfactory explanation because ‘if we can explain our liking for something in terms of its beauty, then 
its beauty cannot be the reason for that liking. If it was, then our explanation would be no explanation 
at all: in response to ‘why do you like it?’ we would say ‘because I like it’. If beauty can be a reason for 
our likings, as it clearly can, then beauty cannot be equated with those likings.’6 I would be inclined to 
agree with Parsons on this point. Expressing a liking for something cannot, in my opinion, be the same 
as saying that we find it beautiful, because we appear to place a value on beauty that is not implicit 
when we simply state that we like such and such a thing. For this reason beauty cannot be reduced to 
a question of likings – to find something beautiful means more than simply liking it, although I do not 
intend to suggest that this is the same as disliking beauty - but the question of why we value beauty in 
this way remains unanswered. If I were to say that it is possible for people to dislike beauty, is would 
still not equate beauty with ‘liking’.   
  
If we consider those things which can be called beautiful, some of them merely happen to be beautiful, 
for example the natural beauty of a landscape or a flower; some things can be beautiful while also 
being functional, having been designed to serve a practical purpose but also to be aesthetically 
pleasing, for example a beautiful building - impressive architecturally, but ultimately intended to be 
functional; but then there are other things like music and art which may, in some cases, be designed 
and created purely to be beautiful, and to be the objects of aesthetic appreciation, without the 
composer or artist necessarily intending for them to be functional in any way. What is the value of 
this? According to Steiner ‘To be beautiful is to be valued’,7 suggesting that beautiful objects, such as 
beautiful artworks or musical works, need have no merit or purpose other than simply being, in order 
for them to be valuable. Furthermore, in saying this, Steiner implies that something is automatically of 
value because it is beautiful, which means that the concepts of beauty and value are inextricably 
linked. Steiner states that ‘Value is thus always central to the meaning of beauty. We often say that 
something or someone is beautiful, in fact, when what we mean is that they have value for us.’8 Here 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Glenn	  Parsons,	  ‘Beauty	  and	  public	  policy’,	  (The	  Commission	  for	  Architecture	  and	  the	  Built	  Environment,	  2010),	  p.	  8	  6	  Ibid.	  	  7	  Wendy	  Steiner,	  Venus	  in	  Exile:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Beauty	  in	  20th	  Century	  Art,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  127	  8	  Ibid.	  p	  XXIII	  
	   7	  
she, like Parsons, adopts the view that beauty is subjective, or ‘in the eye of the beholder’, as opposed 
to the idea of beauty as an objective quality. If something that we find beautiful has value for us but 
not necessarily for everyone else, this surely means that we cannot expect everyone else to find it 
beautiful. This may seem obvious, however, as we shall see, it is not the case. The type of value 
Steiner refers to here is intrinsic and of an aesthetic nature. Aesthetic value is the value of an object 
based entirely on its own merit and is often linked to beauty, however this does not necessarily mean 
that beauty and aesthetic value can, or should, be equated with one another - although Steiner does 
refer to beauty as the aim of aesthetic experience. The concept of value is in itself problematic, but the 
term ‘aesthetic value’ is yet more difficult to define. ‘Value’ can be ascribed to things for many 
different reasons, some of which are extrinsic – having to do with the object in relation to other 
objects, people, needs or uses – and others which are intrinsic, or based solely on the object itself. The 
type of value any one person places on an object, and the reasons for which they value it, can vary 
greatly; therefore it is near impossible to say that one thing is valuable and that another thing is not 
valuable, or that one thing is more valuable than the other. The closest one can come to this is by 
saying that ‘x’ is more valuable to me than ‘y’ is, or that ‘a’ is not valuable to me, or that ‘b’ is valuable to 
me, for whichever reasons apply. When we make a judgement of value in this way - a judgement of 
extrinsic value - we don’t necessarily think that everyone else ought to agree with us, and we can 
appreciate that the value of the object in question depends on a person’s needs and circumstances, or 
on the point of view from which it is viewed. One exception to this is the monetary value of an object. 
The monetary value of an object is arguably an objective extrinsic value and therefore not dependant 
upon a person’s needs, however, I believe that the monetary value of an object becomes more or less 
significant depending on the person evaluating it, and that this in turn means that may be deemed 
valuable by one person while not of much value to another. 
 
 If I say that a certain object is of value to me because I require it to carry out a task, I don’t expect 
that another person not intending to carry out the same task should value the object in the same way. 
This differs from judgements of aesthetic value such as beauty because when we value something for 
its beauty our valuing it is not dependent on our needs or circumstances, and this means that we can 
struggle to see how someone can disagree with us and fail to see the beauty that we see in something. 
Furthermore, if to be beautiful is indeed to be valued, then our saying that something is beautiful is an 
acknowledgement of some intrinsic value belonging to that object, and our acknowledgement of that 
intrinsic value says that we don’t require that thing to have any purpose or function for it to be of 
value to us.  
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Music and art, when appreciated for their aesthetic value, may be valued because of their beauty – ‘to 
be beautiful is to be valued’9 – however, one could say that music and art, particularly modernist 
music and art, in many cases does not aim to be beautiful – or its opposite - at all, and, if this is so, 
what is the value - assuming that it has no obvious extrinsic value - of this type of art? The answer to 
this question must be twofold, as it is dependent on whether or not modernist music and art are truly 
completely without beauty; however, it is also necessary to attempt to define what modernist music is 
as the term ‘modernist’, when applied to music, can be interpreted in different ways. 
 
 
 
 
Modernism in Music  
 
I believe that it is important at this point to decide upon a definition of modernism in order to set the 
parameters for further discussion. Modernism as a movement in art is characteristic of a certain 
period in time and could be seen as a major turning point in the development of music and the other 
arts. Modernism in music began making its first public appearances during the late romantic period, 
with Dahlhaus highlighting the year 1890 as a pivotal point in music history – a time when the 
beginnings of modernism’s emergence crossed-over with the era of the late romantics.  
 
 
Dahlhaus wrote that: 
 
‘In order to characterize turn-of-the-century music in terms of intellectual or 
stylistic history, journalists have been eager (scholars less so) to appropriate 
concepts from literature and the fine arts […] Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that 
no matter how divergent the terms from stylistic or intellectual history bandied 
about by music historians, they all seem to hover about the year 1890, which 
lends itself as an obvious point of historical discontinuity […] The 
“breakthrough” of Mahler, Strauss and Debussy implies a profound historical 
transformation […] If we were to search for a name to convey the breakaway 
mood of the late 1890s […] but without imposing a fictitious unity of style on the 
age, we could do worse than revert to Hermann Bahr’s term “modernism” and 
speak of a stylistically open-ended “modernist music” extending (with some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.	  p.	  127	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latitude) from 1890 to the beginnings of our own twentieth-century modern music 
in 1910.’10 
 
 
The breakaway mood Dahlhaus refers to is, at least in part, due to a period of innovation and 
rejection of existing stylistic, tonal, colouristic and rhythmic norms. I by no means intend to suggest 
that all composers active at this time embraced modernism and its revolutionary spirit in this way; 
however, it was a defining feature of the period. Taruskin names Debussy as ‘the first modernist’, 
stating that he is ‘the man with whom modern music begins.’11 Debussy’s breakaway from the 
prevailing musical mood of the time foreshadowed the emergence of other modernist composers such 
as Ravel, Messiaen, Schoenberg, Stravinsky and Varèse, to name but a few. Taruskin goes on to write 
that ‘Debussy alone managed, at a time when the dominant musical mood was one of exhaustion, to 
turn over a new leaf.’ 12 Debussy, in Taruskin’s opinion, revitalised music at a point in time when it 
had begun, in some ways, to stagnate. His breaking away from musical convention sets him apart 
from other composers of the age and is a key moment in musical history.  
 
Daniel Albright characterises modernism in music as ‘a testing of the limits of aesthetic construction’, 
also writing that ‘the Modernists tried to find the ultimate bounds of certain artistic possibilities: 
volatility of emotion (Expressionism); stability and inexpressiveness (the New Objectivity); accuracy of 
representation (Hyperrealism); absence of representation (Abstractionism)…’13 Albright’s definition of 
modernism draws attention to the feelings of newness, experimentalism, innovation and the pushing of 
boundaries which are present within, and indeed beyond, modernist music and art. Moreover, his 
description of the Modernists as people in search of the ultimate bounds of artistic possibilities – 
people whose aim it was to push boundaries and take risks – is suggestive of a general sense of change 
and progression - an undercurrent of atonality, serialism, unusual rhythms and experimental writing 
swirling just beneath the surface of musical culture. Modernist music, and modernist art in general, so 
it seems, is much less concerned with pleasing listeners and catering to their tastes than it is with 
expanding their horizons, challenging, or even shocking them.  To be modernist means to disregard 
what came before, or to try to create something new and different in order to break ties with the past. 
In short, the essence of modernism is this rule-breaking quest for newness.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Carl	  Dahlhaus,	  Nineteenth-­‐century	  Music,	  trans.	  J.	  Bradford	  Robinson,	  (California:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1980),	  pp.	  332-­‐334	  11	  Richard	  Taruskin,	  ‘The	  First	  Modernist’,	  in	  The	  Danger	  of	  Music	  and	  Other	  Anti-­‐Utopian	  Essays,	  ed.	  Richard	  Taruskin,	  (California:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2009),	  pp.	  195-­‐201,	  p.	  195	  -­‐	  first	  published	  in	  
New	  Republic	  197,	  no.	  26,	  Dec.	  1987,	  pp.	  36-­‐40	  12	  Ibid.	  13	  Daniel	  Albright,	  Modernism	  and	  Music:	  An	  Anthology	  of	  Sources,	  ed.	  Daniel	  Albright,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2004),	  p.	  11	  
	   10	  
Schoenberg, himself a major figure in the development of modernism in music, posed the question 
‘What is new music?’ and answered it by claiming that ‘Evidently it must be music which, though it is 
still music, differs in all essentials from previously composed music. Evidently it must express 
something that has not yet been expressed in music. Evidently, in higher art, only that is worth being 
presented which has never before been presented.’14 This feeling that only what is new and has never 
been seen or heard before is worth writing encapsulates the prevailing attitude amongst modernists. 
Modernist music is therefore music that ‘differs in all essentials from previously composed music’, or, 
as Daniel Chua puts it: 
 
‘Modernity is therefore driven by a need to overcome the past in the name of 
progress, so that the ‘new’ is constantly consigned to be ‘old’ by history. Its only 
point of reference is an idealized ‘ancient world’ against which it defines itself by 
an endless process of self-mutation. Unlike the ancient cosmos, the modern world 
is no longer grounded in a static, hierarchical structure in which one is simply 
born with pre-assigned duties, but is fashioned by historical pressure that turns the 
world into a mass of potential waiting to be transformed by the assertion of the 
human will. […] similarly, the music of modernity, from Ars Nova to the avant-
garde, is driven by the same process of human control and assertion over space, 
time and matter.’15 
 
 
Chua’s claim that the music of modernity is driven by a process of control and assertion over a mass of 
potential waiting to be transformed is in many ways simply a further comment upon modernism’s 
quest to push boundaries, and the modernists’ attempts to find the ‘ultimate bounds’ of artistic 
possibilities. In modernism, what was once considered new soon loses its newness and very quickly 
becomes old. This constantly evolving and reinventing of the genre of modernist music perhaps 
contributes in some way to its reputation for being difficult, inaccessible and lacking beauty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Arnold	  Schoenberg,	  ‘New	  Music,	  Outmoded	  Music,	  Style	  and	  Idea’,	  (1946),	  in	  Style	  and	  Idea:	  Selected	  
Writings	  of	  Arnold	  Schoenberg,	  ed.	  Leonard	  Stein,	  trans.	  Leo	  Black,	  (California:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1984),	  pp.	  113-­‐123,	  p.	  114	  15	  Daniel	  K.	  L.	  Chua,	  Absolute	  Music	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Meaning,	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  p.10	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What Does it Mean to be ‘Classically Beautiful’? 
 
I believe that it would be largely accepted among most people that modernist music is not classically 
beautiful, in the same way that modernist art is not beautiful in the traditional sense of the term or in 
the way in which we have become accustomed to; however, I do not believe that this necessarily 
means that beauty disappeared with the advent of modernism. Classical representations of beauty, or 
open and obvious representations of classical beauty, may have become a rarity, but I find it hard to 
accept that this means that beauty is no longer a part of music or of art. Steiner asks the question: ‘Are 
we taught to identify certain traits – in people, nature, art – as beautiful […]? […] If the response to 
beauty is learned, then how should we react to the fact of this acculturation?’16 Steiner’s suggestion 
that we may be taught to identify certain traits as beautiful is of course problematic if we adopt the 
point of view that beauty is subjective. Nevertheless, that being said, it is a theory which strikes me as 
not only plausible, but probable. If one were to view beauty as an objective quality, rather than as 
something subjective and therefore only existing within the relationship of a subject and an object,17 
the idea of people being taught to identify certain traits as beautiful is much easier to understand. Let 
us for a moment adopt the view that beauty is an objective quality: the traits which we are taught to 
identify as ‘beautiful’ – perhaps traits such as proportion, harmony and symmetry – then, form the 
essence of ‘classical beauty’. A definition of beauty is offered by Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz in his article 
Did Aesthetics Progress,18 in which he lists certain propositions concerning beauty that were essential to 
classical theory. Tatarkiewicz writes that ‘Beauty was also called ‘harmony’, especially with reference to 
beauty of sound, and called ‘symmetry’ with particular reference to visual beauty.’19 This suggestion that 
beauty, harmony and symmetry were more or less synonymous with each other is highly revealing of 
attitudes towards beauty and what was required of something for it to be considered beautiful 
 
In subsequent propositions Tatarkiewicz states that: 
 
‘Beauty consists in the proportion of parts […] may also consist in the 
appropriateness of things to their end, in their adequacy, aptness, suitability. 
The Greeks called this kind of beauty ‘to prepon’ […] They were aware that this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Wendy	  Steiner,	  Venus	  in	  Exile:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Beauty	  in	  20th	  Century	  Art,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  XVIII	  17	  This	  is	  a	  point	  that	  I	  will	  return	  to	  and	  expand	  upon	  later	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  	  If	  beauty	  is	  viewed	  as	  subjective,	  it	  is	  by	  necessity	  dependent	  upon	  a	  personal	  relationship,	  or	  experience,	  between	  a	  person	  and	  the	  object	  in	  question.	  18	  Wladyslaw	  Tatarkiewicz,	  ‘Did	  Aesthetics	  Progress’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Phenomenological	  Research,	  Vol.	  31,	  No.	  1,	  Sep.	  1970,	  pp.	  47-­‐51	  19	  Ibid.	  p.	  47-­‐48	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is a relative beauty and opposed it to the absolute of proportion. They 
appreciated it less. Classical theory considered harmony and symmetry as the only perfect 
beauty [my italics].’20  
 
 
Having established that classical beauty is based on harmony, symmetry and proportion, the ideas of 
balance, rhythm and, to some extent, of conforming to certain criteria to do with cultural norms, can 
also be attributed to classical beauty. A further way in which to define what is classically beautiful in 
music can be drawn from Carol C. Mattusch’s article ‘Naming the ‘Classical’ Style’, in which she 
proffers a definition of what it is to be ‘Classical’.21 Mattusch writes: ‘“Classical” is a "notion" about 
the height of achievement, acknowledged excellence, the standard of perfect beauty. Classical music 
has "clarity, regularity, [and]... established forms."’22  
 
If we now combine these two definitions - what beauty is according to classical theory, and what is it 
means to be classical - music which is classically beautiful can be described as that music which 
displays harmony, balance, symmetry, proportion and a sense of conforming to certain criteria; can 
conceivably be viewed as a standard of ‘perfect beauty’ or the height of achievement; and has clarity, 
regularity and established forms.  Modernist music, clearly, does not fit this definition. Modernism did 
away with conventional harmony and rejected established forms. Held up for scrutiny, pieces of 
modernist music would not be found to be the standard of perfect beauty because they do not fit the 
criteria required to be ‘classically beautiful’. We must of course not forget that this is all said under the 
assumption that beauty is an objective quality, however the fact that this definition of classical beauty 
is possible only when approached from this point of view suggests that if someone can understand only 
what is ‘classically beautiful’ to be beautiful – viewing modernist music and art as inherently not 
beautiful - then that person inadvertently shows that they cannot see beyond the concept of beauty as 
an objective quality belonging only to certain objects. 
 
 
Changing Perceptions of Beauty 
 
In pre-modernist times, attitudes towards beauty in art and aesthetics differed greatly from those 
prevalent in today’s culture, however popular ideas about beauty and what beauty looks like or sounds 
like seem to have changed very little. What was once widely considered beautiful is still widely viewed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Ibid.	  p.	  48	  21	  A	  definition	  she	  states	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  22	  Carol	  C.	  Mattusch,	  ‘Naming	  the	  ‘Classical’	  Style’,	  Hesperia	  Supplements,	  Vol.	  33,	  XAPIΣ	  Essays	  in	  Honor	  of	  Sara	  A.	  Immerwahr,	  2004,	  pp.	  277-­‐290,	  p.	  277	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as being beautiful – take for example the Sistine Chapel, Albinoni’s Adagio in G minor or Botticelli’s 
Birth of Venus - while modern compositions and artworks are seldom received in the same way. One 
example of this is Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring, which famously sparked a riot during its opening night 
in Paris in 1913. This seminal work of modernism, shocking in its disregard of conventional harmony 
and rhythms, being composed instead of what Daniel Chua describes as ‘barbaric rhythms and 
dissonances’23, and combined with Vaslav Nijinsky’s outlandish choreography, has over time become 
accepted into the mainstream canon of ‘classical’ music. The main point I wish to draw attention to 
here is that although The Rite of Spring has been accepted by audiences and listeners it is unlikely that 
many would describe it as being ‘beautiful’. But now the question we are faced with is for what reason 
other than aesthetic pleasure – the generous aim of which, according to Steiner, is beauty – would 
people choose to listen to or perform this seminal work of modernism? There is no extrinsic value for 
which to appreciate the work, therefore it must have some intrinsic value for which we hold it in high 
regard. I believe that the only explanation is that The Rite does allow listeners to experience beauty, 
albeit that it is a savage beauty unlike that of earlier works, and far removed from what the audience 
at its premier in 1913 were accustomed to. 
 
Peter Bannister, in his article ‘The Offence of Beauty in Modern Western Art Music’, notes that 
‘beauty has become a largely unfashionable, even offensive notion within art and philosophy’.24 
Although Bannister’s suggestion that beauty can be in some way offensive is one worth considering, 
and I am willing to concede that it, to some extent, became highly unfashionable for a time, it is 
Steiner’s claim that ‘Modern artworks may often have been profoundly beautiful, but theirs was a 
tough beauty, hedged with deprivation, denial, revolt’25 that is of most interest within the context of 
this discussion. In what way can this tough beauty, experienced through modern art and, presumably, 
also through modernist music, be connected and likened to the earlier ideas about beauty?  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Daniel	  K.	  L.	  Chua,	  ‘Rioting	  with	  Stravinsky:	  A	  Particular	  Analysis	  of	  The	  Rite	  of	  Spring’,	  Music	  Analysis,	  26/i-­‐ii,	  2007,	  Blackwell	  Publishing	  Ltd.	  Accessed	  via	  onlinelibrary.wiley.com	  24	  Peter	  Banister,	  ‘The	  Offence	  of	  Beauty	  in	  Modern	  Western	  Art	  Music’,	  Religions,	  2013,	  4,	  pp.	  687	  –	  700,	  p.	  687	  25	  Wendy	  Steiner,	  Venus	  in	  Exile:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Beauty	  in	  20th	  Century	  Art,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  XV	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Chapter 1 - Beauty         
 
What is Beauty? 
 
 
‘The beautiful is that from which nothing can be taken away and to which nothing 
can be added but for the worse.’   
 
The above statement, attributed to Leon Battista Alberti (1404-1472), on the surface provides a 
seemingly elegant description of what it means to be ‘beautiful’ – for something to be described as 
truly beautiful it must be the perfect version of itself; no attempt to improve upon it can fruitful, and 
any such attempt displays an inability to perceive, recognise or appreciate beauty. However, although 
intriguing and insightful, Alberti’s comment does not actually address the central question of what 
beauty is, or what it means when something is described as beautiful. Moreover, Alberti seems to 
suggest that beauty is a quality which can be found to belong to certain objects or works - a beautiful 
thing has beauty while something which is not beautiful lacks beauty – and this in itself, as we shall 
see, places his statement in opposition to much of the thinking on this subject. Alberti approaches 
beauty from the standpoint that it is an objective quality, while many others view beauty as subjective. 
Interestingly, Glenn Parsons suggests characterising beauty in an almost identical way to Alberti. 
Parsons states that beauty is ‘that which pleases in virtue of its perfection’,26 which, as Ben Rogers 
adds in his article On Beauty, means that ‘we experience beauty when we are confronted with 
something that we would not know how to improve’.27 There is however a subtle but significant 
difference between Rogers’ comment and those of Alberti and Parsons: Alberti and Parsons clearly 
view beauty as a quality which an object can possess, whereas Rogers doesn’t seem to suggest this. For 
Parsons however this isn’t enough; for him ‘just about everything is improvable in some way; nothing, 
as they say, is perfect’,28 and that ‘some beautiful things can seem, at first glance, quite imperfect’.29 
Rogers’ use of the word ‘experience’ is important to note because it roots beauty in experience – in the 
subject’s experience of the object – rather than in the object itself. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Glenn	  Parsons,	  ‘Beauty	  and	  public	  policy’,	  (The	  Commission	  for	  Architecture	  and	  the	  Built	  Environment,	  2010),	  p.	  13	  27	  Ben	  Rogers	  ‘On	  beauty’,	  RSA	  Journal,	  Vol.	  156,	  No.	  5543	  (Autumn	  2010),	  pp.	  26-­‐27,	  p.	  	  26	  28	  Glenn	  Parsons,	  ‘Beauty	  and	  public	  policy’,	  (The	  Commission	  for	  Architecture	  and	  the	  Built	  Environment,	  2010),	  p.	  13	  29	  Ibid.	  p.	  15	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Jumping forward three centuries from Alberti, in Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste Hume writes that 
‘Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them’.30 In 
saying this, Hume rejects the notion of beauty as an attribute possessed by ‘beautiful’ objects. Beauty, 
in Hume’s opinion doesn’t exist as a quality that can be found in things in the way that one can say 
that a table is wooden, a cushion is soft or a vase is red; it is something less concrete than that. 
Furthermore, for one to be able to declare something to be beautiful it must first be experienced, or 
contemplated – we can’t be satisfied by taking someone’s word for it that something is beautiful, we 
have to experience it first hand for ourselves in order to judge for ourselves, and be satisfied that it is 
beautiful - and for this reason the word ‘beauty’ could perhaps be more correctly understood as 
describing the reaction of the observer to the object or work in question, or as describing a quality of 
the experience, than as describing the object or work itself. If I am asked to listen to a piece of music 
and then asked to comment upon it, I might say that I find the music beautiful, however, by this 
reasoning, if I say this I am in fact not referring to a quality of the music itself, I am instead describing 
the way I feel about the music. I am stating that my reaction upon experiencing and connecting with 
this piece of music through listening to it is one of beauty. I listened to the music and I sensed beauty, 
but that doesn’t necessarily mean that I identified beauty in the music. If pressed for an explanation of 
what exactly I think is beautiful, or makes the piece beautiful, I might say that the melody is beautiful, 
or that the harmony is beautiful, or that the orchestration is beautiful, but if pressed further it would 
be impossible to pinpoint precisely why that particular melodic line is beautiful, what it is that makes it 
beautiful, or why that particular harmony is beautiful. This is because the piece is only beautiful due 
to the response it elicits. The piece is only beautiful because I say it is beautiful.  
 
Kant, in his Critique of Judgement, notes that ‘[the feeling of pleasure or displeasure] denotes nothing in 
the object, but is a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by 
the representation.’31 While not exclusively connected with judgements of beauty, feelings of pleasure 
or displeasure are closely linked with them, therefore Kant’s statement, made in the context of a 
discussion about judgements of taste, is of relevance here because a feeling of pleasure is associated 
with beauty. A judgement of something as being beautiful ‘denotes nothing in the object’ but rather it 
is ‘a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is affected by the 
representation’, meaning that my description of the music as ‘beautiful’ says nothing at all about the 
music itself, but instead describes the manner in which I was affected by it.  
 
Writing over 200 years after Hume and Kant, Ferdia Stone-Davis echoes their thoughts, stating that 
‘beauty is a means by which one understands the process of aesthetic appreciation rather than a 
quality of the world itself, and meaning is located in the intellectual powers of the subject rather than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  David	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Standard	  of	  Taste’,	  1757,	  paragraph	  7,	  Kindle	  edition,	  published	  2011	  31	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Judgement,	  1790,	  (this	  ed.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  35	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the material object…Beauty is only ever latent within the relationship of subject and object’; that it 
‘emerges from experience’.32 Stone-Davies, like both Hume and Kant, sees beauty not as a quality 
that an object, person, artwork, or musical composition can possess, but as something which has more 
to do with a person’s reaction to the thing in question than with the thing itself.  
 
Thoughtful consideration of these two notions alongside each other however casts a different light on 
things: the distinction between the two ideas no longer appears as black and white as it at first seemed, 
becoming instead more indistinct and uncertain the more closely one considers it. I don’t believe that 
these comments must necessarily be seen to contradict each other, although a cursory glance at them 
may give the impression that that is the case. Alberti, by not clearly stating what it is that he believes 
makes something beautiful, leaves open to interpretation his exact meaning. Consider this - by adding 
or taking away from something we have the ability not only to alter the subject itself, but also to alter 
others’ experiences of that object or work, and in so doing to change their reaction to it, which in turn 
will change their relationship with it, making it either better or worse, more enjoyable or less 
enjoyable, or, perhaps, even more beautiful or less beautiful. This last claim – of having the ability to 
make something more or less beautiful – is a contentious one, because, if we are to understand beauty 
as the pinnacle of aesthetic success, then it can be argued that ranking ‘beauty’ is not possible. Taking 
this into account, by adding or taking away from an experience we can either make it beautiful, or 
cause it to no longer be beautiful. This kind of beauty – manmade beauty – is artistic beauty, and is of 
a different nature from that of natural beauty, which is not created or designed by a person or people.  
 
Hegel, in his Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics writes that ‘artistic beauty stands higher than nature’ 
because ‘the beauty of art is the beauty born – born again, that is, of the mind; and by as much as the 
mind and its products are higher than nature and its appearances, by so much the beauty of art is 
greater than the beauty of nature.’33 Here, Hegel’s placement of artistic beauty above natural beauty 
highlights the value placed on artistic beauty. Artistic beauty- beauty born again of the mind – is the 
type of beauty with which we shall primarily be concerned. Schopenhauer’s thinking on natural 
beauty is mixed however, like Hegel, when he considers artistic beauty alongside natural beauty, he 
‘locate[s] natural beauty at the lower levels of his aesthetic theory’.34 Robert Wicks writes that 
‘Schopenhauer’s estimation of natural beauty’s value is […] mixed. He affirmatively maintains that 
aesthetically contemplating a tree (for example) can raise us to a level of universalistic awareness, free 
from frustrating desire, and produce a measure of transcendent tranquillity […] When Schopenhauer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Ferdia	  Stone-­‐Davis,	  Musical	  Beauty,	  (Oregon:	  Cascade	  Books,	  2011),	  pp.	  81-­‐85	  33	  Georg	  Wilhelm	  Friedrich	  Hegel,	  Introductory	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics,	  trans.	  Bernard	  Bosanquet,	  Chapter	  1,	  ‘The	  Range	  of	  the	  Aesthetic	  Defined,	  and	  Some	  Objections	  Against	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Art	  Refuted’,	  sectionα , (England:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2004),	  p.	  4	  34	  Robert	  L.	  Wicks,	  European	  Aesthetics:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  from	  Kant	  to	  Derrida,	  (London:	  Oneworld	  Publications,	  2013),	  p.	  104	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contrasts natural beauty with artistic beauty, however, […] his attitude towards natural beauty 
becomes disapproving. From this angle, he states that natural beauty can deceptively fix our attention 
upon mere appearances, as it fills us with joy in the presence of a sunset’s bright colours, or a flower’s 
soft petals and fragrance.’35  
 
A further interesting point can be found towards the beginning of Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on 
Aesthetics, namely that he seems almost to equate beauty with art, making them appear interchangeable 
– or at least closely linked - while at the same time maintaining a clear distinction between the two 
concepts. He states that ‘Beauty and art, no doubt, pervade all the business of life like a kindly genius, 
and form the bright adornment of all our surroundings, both mental and material’,36 suggesting that 
art cannot be without beauty, and, also, that beauty and art are both necessarily positive. 
 
Stone-Davis writes that beauty is something we can continually pursue and yet never make our own.37 
No matter how long we spend seeking beauty, it remains just beyond our grasp – tangible, but 
impossible to hold on to. We can experience beauty, but once we have experienced it we can’t take it 
away with us; we can’t capture the feeling and make it last. While listening to a piece of music or 
viewing an artwork we may be able to experience beauty, however when the music stops, or upon 
stepping away from the artwork, all that we are left with is a lingering sensation that reminds us of the 
beauty we just experienced. We still have the same desire for beauty as we had before we began 
listening to the music or looking upon the painting, it doesn’t go away, isn’t satiated for a time before 
reappearing, the way other desires are.  As this is the case, the value of beauty is constant and is not 
dependent upon our needs or a feeling of want.  
 
The pursuit of beauty, then, can never reach a fully satisfying end. There can be no closure for those 
seeking to experience beauty, as by its very nature beauty denies us this. If we go back further in time, 
during the dialogue between Socrates and Agathon in Plato’s Symposium, Agathon poses the 
question: ‘Surely it’s not just probable but necessary that desire is directed at something you need and 
that if you don’t need something you don’t desire it?’38 People desire beauty, however beauty isn’t 
something that is needed and desired it the way in which other more material things are. It could be 
argued that there is no ‘need’ for beauty,39 yet it is still desirable. Once a need is met is can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.	  pp.	  104-­‐105	  36	  Georg	  Wilhelm	  Friedrich	  Hegel,	  Introductory	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics,	  trans.	  Bernard	  Bosanquet,	  Chapter	  1,	  ‘The	  Range	  of	  the	  Aesthetic	  Defined,	  and	  Some	  Objections	  Against	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Art	  Refuted’,	  section	  β	  (England:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2004),	  p.	  5	  37	  Ferdia	  Stone-­‐Davis,	  Musical	  Beauty,	  (Oregon:	  Cascade	  Books,	  2011),	  p.	  73	  38	  Plato,	  The	  Symposium,	  (England:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1999),	  p.	  34	  39	  Roger	  Scruton	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  and	  writes	  that	  ‘Our	  need	  for	  beauty	  is	  not	  something	  that	  we	  could	  lack	  and	  still	  be	  fulfilled	  as	  people.	  It	  is	  a	  need	  arising	  from	  out	  metaphysical	  condition,	  as	  free	  individuals,	  seeking	  our	  place	  in	  a	  shared	  and	  public	  world…’,	  Beauty,	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2009),	  p.	  174	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expected that the desire for whatever was required to meet that need will disappear, but this is not the 
case with beauty. To say that one can satiate one’s appetite for beautiful things implies that beauty is 
sought out for a purpose; to meet some need, the way a starving man seeks physical nourishment, or a 
thirsty man seeks a source of hydration. Once these needs are met the desire disappears - even if it will 
reappear again at some point in the future - however the desire for beauty is not like this. Listening to 
a piece of music and enjoying its beauty does not mean that someone will have had their fill of beauty 
for the time being and will have no desire to listen to any more music.  
 
If, as I have argued, beauty is not something that we need in order to live, is it possible that beauty can 
be something to live for? I believe that beauty can be something to live for, in the same way that 
happiness can be seen as something to strive towards and pursue. In this situation beauty is an end in 
itself – the ultimate end - because we have no need that can be met by it and we don’t want to do 
anything with it once we have found it. Rather, our goal is beauty itself. If we live for beauty our 
pursuit of beauty is disinterested, and, in the same way, our desire for beauty is also disinterested. 
 
Our desire for beauty is disinterested, and we know this because we do not view beauty as a means to 
an end – ‘wanting something for its beauty is wanting it, not wanting to do something with it’.40 It 
follows from this that our interest in art qua art or music qua music is also disinterested, as in order to 
appreciate a musical work or a work of art solely on its musical or artistic merit it is necessary to set 
aside any feeling of ‘need’ and appreciate the work as an end in itself. Only by viewing something as 
an end in itself is it possible to see clearly the work as it is, without the risk of judging it based on 
extraneous matters. This emphasis on seeing something as an end in itself is a Kantian idea and is 
central to his thinking on beauty. In order to appreciate something or someone as an end in itself a 
person must be disinterested. Kant writes, of beauty, that ‘of all these three kinds of delight [the 
agreeable; the beautiful; and the good], that of taste in the beautiful may be said to be the one and 
only disinterested and free delight; for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason, extorts 
approval.’41 
 
It is true that musical works and works of art can be used purposefully, in order to achieve an aim or 
with an aim in mind, however, in such a situation the work is being appreciated for some extrinsic 
value as opposed to for its own intrinsic value. The idea of value is something which I will return to at 
a later point, for now however it will suffice to say that when music or art is being valued in this way 
the work of art is not being appreciated or valued as art, but as a means to an end.  It is being valued 
for its instrumental value, or value as a tool for some purpose, rather than its artistic and aesthetic 
value. With this in mind, it can be argued that art, including music, if it is to be appreciated purely for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Roger	  Scruton,	  Beauty,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  p.	  19	  41	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Judgement,	  1790,	  (this	  ed.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  41	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its aesthetic merit, is inherently lacking a purpose or function. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant raises 
the idea of purposive purposelessness – being purposive yet without purpose; being meaningful while 
being without a function. ‘Free or pure beauty’, as he calls it, differs from dependant or adherent 
beauty in that it is not dependant upon the concept of purpose. The pure beauty of something can be 
appreciated and valued without knowing what it is and what, if any, its purpose is. This type of 
purposiveness, Wicks writes, ‘arises at a higher level of abstraction’.42 Absolute music is music at its 
highest level of abstraction; however even in absolute music there is beauty through purposiveness. 
The purposeless purposiveness that Kant refers to can also be thought of as a type of ‘designedness’, or 
‘meaningfulness’ - a beauty born of the mind, such as what Wicks describes as ‘playfully aimless 
formal designs’ which are ‘suggestively intelligent’.43 Another way to think of this might be to 
understand ‘meaningfulness’ as a central point in the discussion of beauty and purposive 
purposelessness. Describing something as meaningful does not mean that it has a specific discernible 
meaning, but it does mean that it is of value. Kathleen Stock writes that ‘works of art, generally, are 
essentially meaningful; which is to say that what they are ‘there for’ is to be understood. This is not 
just to say that meaning can be found in them […] but something stronger: that, in some sense, their 
nature prescribes that one try to understand them’.44 Stock’s comment supports Kant’s idea of 
purposive purposelessness albeit in relation to art itself rather than beauty or artistic value. Works of 
art, in Stock’s opinion, exist for a purpose more significant than conveying meaning, and their 
purpose – or what they are ‘there for’ - which is specific to themselves, has nothing to do with being 
functional but is instead simply to be contemplated and appreciated for their own sake. They have a 
purposiveness which is not dependent on them being functional.  
 
Kant describes beauty as being: ‘the object of disinterested satisfaction’;45 ‘universal’;46 ‘purposive and 
yet without purpose’;47 and ‘necessary’, or ‘an object of necessary delight’.48 However, Hume writes 
that ‘One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Robert	  L.	  Wicks,	  European	  Aesthetics:	  A	  Critical	  Introduction	  from	  Kant	  to	  Derrida,	  (London:	  Oneworld	  Publications,	  2013),	  p.	  24	  43	  Ibid.	  p.	  11	  44	  Kathleen	  Stock,	  Introduction	  to	  Philosophers	  on	  Music:	  Experience,	  Meaning	  and	  Work,	  ed.	  Kathleen	  Stock,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p.	  4	  45	  ‘Taste	  is	  the	  faculty	  of	  judging	  an	  object	  or	  mode	  of	  representation	  by	  means	  of	  a	  delight	  or	  aversion	  
apart	  from	  any	  interest.	  The	  object	  of	  such	  a	  delight	  is	  called	  beautiful.’,	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  
Judgement,	  First	  Book,	  First	  Moment	  S5	  (This	  ed.	  trans.	  James	  Creed	  Meredith,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  P.42)	  46	  ‘The	  beautiful	  is	  that	  which,	  apart	  from	  any	  concept,	  pleases	  universally.’,	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  
Judgement,	  First	  Book,	  Second	  Moment,	  S9	  (This	  ed.	  trans.	  James	  Creed	  Meredith,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  p.51)	  47	  ‘Beauty	  is	  the	  form	  of	  purposiveness	  in	  an	  object,	  so	  far	  as	  this	  is	  perceived	  in	  it	  apart	  from	  the	  
representation	  of	  an	  end.’,	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Judgement,	  First	  Book,	  Third	  Moment,	  S17	  (This	  ed.	  trans.	  James	  Creed	  Meredith,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  P.	  66)	  48	  ‘The	  beautiful	  is	  that	  which,	  apart	  from	  a	  concept,	  is	  cognized	  as	  [an]	  object	  of	  a	  necessary	  delight.’	  First	  Book,	  Forth	  Moment,	  S22,	  (This	  ed.	  p.	  71)	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  trans.	  James	  Creed	  Meredith,	  Critique	  of	  
Judgement,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	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individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others’,49 
which does not sit comfortably with Kant’s idea of beauty as universal and necessary. When Kant says 
that beauty is universal what he means is that when we believe something is beautiful we also believe 
that other people should agree with us. This does not necessarily mean that we believe that everyone 
does agree with us, only that we can’t see how any reasonable person could possibly disagree with us.  
 
 
Kant writes that: 
 
‘In all judgements by which we describe anything as beautiful we tolerate no one 
else being of a different opinion, and yet we do not rest our judgement upon 
concepts, but only on our feeling […] The assertion is not that everyone will fall in 
with our judgement, but rather that everyone ought to agree with it.’50 
 
 
Another of Kant’s key themes in his discussion of beauty is the idea of beauty as something that 
encourages cognitive free-play, or free-play of the imagination.51  This differs from some other 
definitions of beauty in that it describes what beauty should do, rather than what beauty should look 
or sound like. Beauty, by this definition, is that which encourages and facilitates harmony of the senses 
and cognition, bringing together the rational and the sensory, and allowing us to free our minds and 
imaginations. It can entrance and inspire, provoking thought and giving pleasure while not fulfilling 
any function. If we consider the concept of beauty from this angle, it can be concluded that anything 
which allows us to experience the pleasure of this free-play can rightly be called beautiful, and that 
there is no requirement for an object to look a certain way, or for a piece of music to sound a certain 
way, for it to be beautiful. Furthermore, if one agrees that ‘To be beautiful is to be valued’,52 we now 
have the basis for an argument that beauty can in fact be located within modernism, and that 
modernist music and art have value, aesthetic value, by virtue of their beauty.  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  David	  Hume,	  ‘Of	  the	  Standard	  of	  Taste’,	  1757,	  paragraph	  7,	  Kindle	  edition	  published	  2011	  50	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  Critique	  of	  Judgement,	  1790,	  (this	  ed.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  p.	  70	  51	  ‘…	  that	  which	  Kant	  places	  at	  the	  core	  of	  aesthetic	  experience,	  the	  harmony	  of	  the	  free	  play	  of	  the	  cognitive	  powers.’,	  Ferdia	  Stone-­‐Davis,	  Musical	  Beauty,	  (Oregon:	  Cascade	  Books,	  2011),	  p.	  81	  52	  Wendy	  Steiner,	  Venus	  in	  Exile:	  The	  Rejection	  of	  Beauty	  in	  20th	  Century	  Art,	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002),	  p.	  127	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Beauty in Modernist Music and Art 
 
What is of great importance in the context of this discussion is how we are to define beauty. Is beauty 
really about the external appearance of an object, or the way a musical work actually sounds? From 
what I have written above I think it can be concluded that beauty is not actually to do with any 
physical quality of an object, but is instead more to do with the effect something has on us, for 
example, the extent to which it encourages free-play of the imagination; whether or not we desire it 
without any particular need for it or desire to use it for any purpose; and whether or not we view it as 
something which cannot be improved upon or changed for the better. A further sign that we find 
something beautiful is an unwillingness to consider why someone else may disagree with us, therefore, 
if something encourages free-play of our imagination, we desire it as an end in itself, cannot see how it 
could be changed for the better and cannot understand why anyone could feel differently towards it, 
we find that thing – be it a musical work, a painting, a sculpture, a poem or anything else – to be 
beautiful. Beauty is located within this sphere of subjective, experience-based relationships of subject 
and object, but this doesn’t have to mean that the objective qualities of an object do not contribute 
towards it. The traits that we are taught to identify as beautiful – the traits that make something 
‘classically beautiful’ – can have an effect on how we relate to something, and this in turn can affect 
our experience of it and our reaction to it.  
 
Modernist music, take for example The Rite of Spring, of which I spoke earlier, is, I believe, often 
profoundly beautiful – as Steiner suggests that modern artworks may be – however, its beauty isn’t of 
the sort that we are taught and conditioned to recognise. The Rite is overwhelming, all-consuming, 
rough and at times violent, but it demands the attention of listeners and compels you to continue 
listening. The unearthly plaintive quality of the opening bassoon solo, the earthy and powerful impact 
of incessantly rhythmic driving passages, the repeated stabbing chords and the moments of almost 
tranquil stillness all come together to create a piece of music that is truly beautiful, in the fullest sense 
of the word. This is without a doubt a work that facilitates free-play of the imagination and harmony 
of the senses and cognition; however, on top of this it is something which is desirable for it own 
intrinsic aesthetic value - as an end in itself – and it is difficult to see how it could possibly be improved 
upon, or changed but for the worse.  
 
Other modernist works can be considered in this way and found to be similarly beautiful, take for 
example Anton Webern’s Symphony Op. 21.  Webern’s Symphony is, like The Rite, not beautiful in a 
conventional way, but it is beautiful nonetheless. The shifting harmonies and textures, which seem to 
grow out of the horn entry at the opening of the work and weave in and out of each other, create a 
sonorous space in which the mind of the listener can wander freely, engaging both their cognition and 
senses in what Kant describes as free-play of the imagination. This is because Webern’s use of 
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serialism, symmetry and variation within the work - particularly when combined with the complex 
and concentrated nature of this miniature ‘symphony’ - mean that it can challenge and stimulate 
listeners intellectually, while at the same time allowing them to enjoy the music on a sensual level.  
 
When speaking of Webern’s opus 21 George Benjamin is quoted as having said: 
 
‘Paradoxically, this product of hermetic constructivism seems infused with intense 
emotion, that emotion evenly diffused across the whole surface of the music. Gone is 
the mono-directional thrust of Classical and Romantic music; in its place a world of 
rotations and reflections, opening myriad paths for the listener to trace through 
textures of luminous clarity yet beguiling ambiguity.’53  
 
It is within the ‘world of rotations and reflections’ which Benjamin speaks of that listeners have the 
chance to ‘trace through textures of luminous clarity yet beguiling ambiguity’ that beauty is located. 
Beauty, again, is found in the experience of listening to and connecting with the music. Although 
Webern’s Symphony may not be beautiful in the way that Classical or Romantic music was, it is no 
less beautiful. The beauty of this work, like Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring and many other modernist 
works, is due to the effect that it can have upon listeners and not because of any particular feature of 
the work itself. The features and qualities of a work do, however, affect the way in which listeners will 
experience it, and this is perhaps where some of the confusion surrounding this subject stems from. 
 
Modernist music and art may not be obviously beautiful in the narrow sense of the word, but, with a 
little consideration, the indefinable quality which draws people to it can be identified as true beauty. 
Composers such as Stravinsky, Webern, Ligeti, Bartok, Ives, Varèse and Salzedo have all written 
music of great beauty, but the beauty of their music – to varying degrees - when compared with the 
music of earlier composers, may not always be so obvious. To be able to experience the type of beauty 
found in modernist music listeners must be open to it and willing to concede that their preconceived 
ideas about beauty may not be correct, rather than being opposed to the idea that something must be 
unbeautiful because it doesn’t sound the way they expect something beautiful to sound. The effect that 
music has on a listener is of more significance than the way it sounds. That being said, the elements of 
‘classical beauty’, or the elements that traditionally make something beautiful – proportion, balance, 
harmony, symmetry and even rhythm – are still very much a feature of modernist music. What is it 
that makes a composition feel ‘finished’, makes a rest or note feel the right length, or makes a phrase 
sound correct? It is the central elements of proportion, harmony, balance and symmetry that have this 
effect. Beauty is rooted in experience and a subject’s relationship with the object they are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Tom	  Service,	  ‘Symphony	  Guide:	  Webern’s	  op	  21’,	  The	  Guardian,	  17th	  December	  2013	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experiencing, meaning that an object need not be ‘classically beautiful’ for it to be beautiful, however, 
the things that cause an object – be it a piece of music, a painting, a sculpture or anything else - to 
affect a person in a certain way are physical qualities of the object. Proportion, balance, harmony and 
symmetry – the traits that mark something out as ‘beautiful’ – are concealed within modernist music 
and art. However, I believe that it is still these traits which cause people to find this type of art – 
modernist art – beautiful. Beauty in modernism therefore could be said to stem from the same place as 
classical beauty, though they appear very different in character. Scruton uses the novels of Zola as an 
example of this, writing that ‘Even in the brutal presentations of thwarted and malicious life that fill 
the novels of Zola we find, if not the reality of beauty, at least a distant glimpse of it – recorded in the 
rhythm of the prose…’54  
 
Further examples of beauty in modernism can be found in other art forms, such as in the paintings 
and sculptures of Marcel Duchamp, Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque and Gustav Klimt; in poetry – 
take for example The Waste Land, written by T. S. Eliot; and in dance – in the choreography of Vaslav 
Nijinsky and the technique developed in the 1920s by Martha Graham. Much modernist visual art 
differs from earlier styles in that it is less concerned with attempting to represent things, people or 
places as they appear, and instead adopts a more abstract approach to creating images. Marcel 
Duchamp’s Nude Descending a Staircase No. 2, Picasso’s Girl Before a Mirror and Braque’s Woman with a 
Guitar all depict women; however, none of them attempt to show the subject of the painting in a 
realistic way. Form, shape and line become the main focus of the work, and this is where beauty can 
be found. Georges Braque’s comment that the new type of beauty he sought to create would appear 
‘in terms of volume, of line, of mass, [and] of weight’, is made manifest through works such as the ones 
mentioned above. These works allow the beholder to form a relationship with the images through 
which they feel the purposiveness of the shapes and lines that come together in such a way as to 
provoke cognitive free-play and an awareness of beauty. Nijinsky, who is widely regarded as one of the 
greatest male dancers of the 20th century, pushed boundaries in ballet, scandalising audiences with his 
daring new style of choreography and dance; Martha Graham revolutionised modern dance and 
influenced it in the way Stravinsky influenced music and Picasso influenced visual art; T.S. Eliot’s The 
Waste Land is one of the most significant works of modernist poetry and is filled with themes such as 
death and desolation, yet in its portrayal of the damaged state of modern humanity it has a beauty 
that cannot be denied. Beauty isn’t only found in what is pretty or charming; beauty can also be found 
in the distorted and the unfamiliar, in sadness and desolation, in the provocative and in the shocking. 
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Scruton writes that ‘some of the most meaningful works of recent times have been downright ugly and 
even offensive in their raw-nerve impact […] To call such works beautiful is in a way to diminish and 
even trivialise what they are trying to say’, however he goes on to say that ‘Art, he [Schiller] suggests, 
takes us out of the everyday practical concerns, by providing us with objects, characters, scenes and 
actions with which we can play, and which we can enjoy for what they are, rather than what they do 
for us […] In play, elevated by art to the level of free contemplation, reason and sense are reconciled 
[…] In appreciating art we are playing; the artist too is playing in creating it. And the result is not 
always beautiful, or beautiful in a predictable way. But this lucid attitude is fulfilled by beauty…’.55 
The type of beauty that Scruton first speaks of is that which is classically beautiful, or, to use his own 
words, ‘beautiful in a predictable way’. The ugliness and raw-nerve impact of the works he refers to 
may not be immediately beautiful, but in the way in which they enable us to play and engage in free 
contemplation - which is what Kant describes as free-play of the imagination - they allow us, as 
listeners, viewers or performers, to encounter beauty. These types of works may not be beautiful in an 
obvious way but this is because their beauty lies in the way they are able to affect us. A further 
suggestion put forward by Scruton is that when we ‘praise works of art that we deny to be beautiful’ 
ugliness could be said to be ‘absorbed into, redeemed by, a higher beauty’.56 The higher beauty that 
Scruton refers to here is, I believe, the beauty of the way in which the works can affect us by allowing 
us to engage in play and free contemplation. It is beauty that goes beyond being pretty or charming 
and affects us – the listener or viewer - in a deeper, more visceral way; which is not to say that it 
cannot also affect us intellectually, only that its effect upon us is stronger and more instinctual than the 
beauty of more superficially or predictably beautiful art. 
 
Theodor Adorno’s thoughts on ugliness, beauty and art are set out in his Aesthetic Theory. In it Adorno 
posits that the categories of the ugly and the beautiful are dynamic, and writes that because of this 
they ‘Both mock definitional fixation’.57 If the concept of beauty, or the category of the beautiful, is 
dynamic and ever changing – as Adorno says it is – this confirms that modernist music and art need 
not be anything like earlier music or art in order to be beautiful. As discussed earlier, modernist music 
is indeed vastly different from what came before it, and yet it can still be beautiful. This highlights just 
how dynamic and unfixed the category of ‘the beautiful’ is. Beauty, according to Adorno, is ‘the result 
not of a simple equilibrium per se, but rather of the tension that results.’58 This tension is the result of 
the way in which disparate elements are brought together in a composition or artwork. I believe that 
ugliness – the impression of which ‘stems from violence and destruction’59 – can be used effectively to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Ibid.	  pp.	  127-­‐128	  56	  Roger	  Scruton,	  The	  Aesthetics	  of	  Music,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  pp.	  373-­‐374	  57	  Theodor	  W.	  Adorno,	  ed.	  by	  Gretel	  Adorno	  and	  Rolf	  Tiedemann,	  trans.	  by	  Robert	  Hullot-­‐Kentor,	  (New	  York:	  Bloomsbury,	  1997),	  p.	  64	  58	  Ibid.	  p.	  63	  59	  Ibid	  p.	  64	  
	   25	  
create this tension, and that being part of the resulting beauty is a further way in which it can cease to 
be ugly. Adorno expresses this idea when he writes that ‘There is nothing putatively ugly that would 
not be able through a transformation of its position in the work […] to discard its ugliness.’60  
 
On the subject of art and society, Adorno states that: 
 
‘The concept of art […] refuses definition […] The definition of art is at every 
point indicated by what art once was, but is legitimated only by what art became 
with regard to what it wants to, and perhaps can, become […] Because art is what 
it has become’.61  
 
Art, including music, has changed dramatically over time, and modernist music was - for a time - 
what music became. With modernism came an alteration in the relationship between beauty and art, 
but also in that of art and society and, so it follows, beauty and society.  A new type of beauty emerged 
in modernist music, and the categories of the beautiful and the ugly overlapped and intertwined. 
Society has to some extent come to accept and embrace this new type of beauty in art, however 
modernism and modernist art remain to be seen as difficult and inaccessible by some people. In 
Adorno and Eisler’s Composing for the Films, they write of the ways in which ‘big business has fettered 
the freedom of artistic creation’ and there was an ‘unjustifiable oversimplification of musical 
language.’62 This fettering of artistic creation and oversimplification of musical language is just one 
way in which music has been adapted to fit societies needs and wants, and it shows how the 
relationship between music, or art in general, and society is not always equal or balanced.  
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Chapter 2 - Value         
 
Values of Art  
 
Up until now I have focused on the concepts of beauty and aesthetic value but at this point in our 
discussion I shall turn my attention to examine the idea of value more closely. Beauty and value can 
be linked to each other in a way that is central to the meaning of each concept because, as has been 
established above, describing something as beautiful denotes not just a liking, but also a valuing of the 
object – ‘To be beautiful is to be valued’.63 This much is true, but several questions are left hanging in 
the air: What does it mean to be valued? What does it mean to value something? What is value? Why 
do we value beauty? How do we demonstrate that we value something? In what ways is it clear that 
we value beauty? In the following chapter I will address some of these questions, starting with an 
elucidation of the term ‘value’ and the different ways in which it can be used. 
 
Any one thing can have many different kinds of value, depending upon the person evaluating it and 
the point of view from which they make this judgement. One person may value something for one 
reason while another values the same thing for an entirely different reason, and because of the 
different ways each person views the object – what they intend to use it for, or the reasons for which 
they appreciate it - the type of value involved in each case is different. One person may value a 
phrasebook as a useful tool to help them communicate while holidaying in a foreign country while 
someone else may see the same phrasebook’s value as a doorstop, or as a product that they could sell 
to make a profit. All of these are examples of extrinsic values of the phrasebook; they are examples of 
how the book can be valuable by being useful in some way, in other words, they show that the book 
can have several instrumental or extrinsic values. 
 
‘Whatever can be evaluated, can be evaluated from different points of view, and 
corresponding to the point of view from which it is assessed, the value attributed 
to it will be of a different kind. So a work of art can have many different kinds of 
value – a cognitive value, a social value, an educational value, a historical value, a 
sentimental value, a religious value, an economic value, a therapeutic value… 
‘artistic value’ or ‘the value of a work of art as a work of art.’64  
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This is the kind of value with which this paper is concerned; the value of art, specifically music, as art, 
without any wish to exploit it or use it for any end. Budd writes that ‘if a work possesses artistic value, 
this does not consist in the work’s actually accomplishing some valuable end in the case of one, some 
or many of us’.65  
 
It is worth noting that Budd uses the term ‘artistic value’, not ‘aesthetic value’. Dominic McIver Lopes 
raises the question of whether or not it is possible to have artistic value without aesthetic value in his 
article ‘The Myth of (Non-Aesthetic) Artistic Value’. As he correctly points out, the idea of whether or 
not it is possible to have non-aesthetic artistic value is dependent on our definition of artistic value. If 
artistic value is taken to be nothing more than value in art, the term ‘artistic value’ can include 
‘aesthetic value, cognitive value, moral value, therapeutic value, political value, propaganda value, 
economic value, decorative value, entertainment value, hedonic value, distraction value, prurient 
value, theological value, communicative value, bragging value, [and] collector value’66 which allows 
artistic value to be possible without aesthetic value; however, if artistic value is understood as ‘the 
value of a work of art as a work of art’ or if, as Lopes puts it, ‘artistic value is not mere value in art; it is 
value as art, value that an art work has by its nature’,67 then non-aesthetic artistic value cannot exist. 
As reasonable as this premise is, how is one to decide which values are values in art and which values 
are values as art? Value as art, I believe, can be characterised as the intrinsic and non-instrumental 
value of the work of art, which, as I discussed above, is known as aesthetic value. Lopes’ conclusion – 
with which I agree - is that ‘Artistic value as distinct from aesthetic value is not an option.’68  
 
I believe that by valuing something we are expressing a feeling, whether consciously or subconsciously, 
that this particular thing, object, artwork, or piece of music has something to offer us - there is 
something which can be gained by possessing it or experiencing it - and we desire to have it; however, 
if music, appreciated solely as music, or art appreciated solely as art, is useless - lacking a purpose and 
of no material use to anyone - then what is the explanation for our valuing it? What is it that it offers 
us that we are unable to find anywhere else? I say ‘if’ because I believe that it is important to remain 
open to the possibility of other ideas, however the fact is that to appreciate something as an end in 
itself means that this must be to the exclusion of all instrumental or extrinsic values. 
 
Even within the realm of music we at times exhibit a ‘desire for the particular’; a desire not just for 
music, but for a specific piece of music. It would be conceivable for someone to desire music without 
desiring a specific piece of music, for example desiring some music to be used as background music to 	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fill silence without having any real preference for what music was used, however, in this situation the 
music is being valued as a means to and end – a means to fill silence. When we desire a particular 
piece of music we could also desire it for some reason related to an extrinsic value, but in some cases 
the we may desire it for no reason other than to listen it and enjoy it as a piece of music. The value we 
place on the musical work which we desire in this way is of a specifically aesthetic nature; it is a desire 
for beauty, and this brings us to the question of why we value beauty and beautiful things. Why do we 
value aesthetic value? 
 
 
 
The Value of Beauty and Aesthetic Value 
 
For something to have aesthetic value does not mean that it has to be devoid of any other value, but if 
it is being valued based on its aesthetic merit any other extrinsic value it has must be disregarded.69 
The question of why people do, or should, value beauty, or art purely as art, at all, or why aesthetic 
value matters takes us back to the idea of purposive purposelessness. In general, if an object has a 
function or purpose we value it because it can be useful in some way; however, music, or indeed art in 
general, when appreciated as an end in itself has no function and no apparent purpose. This suggests 
that there must be some other reason for valuing it. If the aim of art is to be beautiful – not necessarily 
beautiful in the narrow sense of the word which is associated with classical beauty, but in a wider, 
more thoughtful and considered sense – then as long as art achieves its aim, because it is beautiful we 
value it, and this is apparent through our desiring of it, but this still does not answer the question ‘why 
do we value and desire beautiful things?’ ‘”If it is their beauty that we desire, why should we value 
beauty in this way? ‘The lover of beautiful things has a desire – what is it that he desires? That they 
become his own…”’70. This dialogue between Socrates and Doitima can be found in Plato’s The 
Symposium and it highlights the almost irrational nature of our desire, but it also shows that even in our 
desire for aesthetic value we express the same feeling as we do with other types of value – that the 
thing in question has something to offer us; that it is able to give us something that we need and can’t 
find elsewhere.  
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There is something in music, and indeed art in general, which we as a society are in constant pursuit 
of. This sets it apart from the other things in life, which have a use and are valuable for a defined 
purpose. Roger Scruton writes that ‘the interest in information is satiable; as is the interest in food. But 
there are interests which are by their nature insatiable. Aesthetic interest is like this.’71 Our insatiable 
appetite for whatever it is that drives us to seek out beautiful music or beautiful artworks again and 
again points to the intrinsic value of music. John O’Neill examines the different kinds of intrinsic, i.e. 
non-instrumental, values that are possible in his article ‘The Varieties of Intrinsic Value’ which 
appeared in The Monist in April 1992.72 Extrinsic value can be linked to dependent beauty – as 
opposed to free beauty, which is the kind of beauty that ‘attaches to the object of perception viewed 
not as of a kind but solely as an individual in its own right’73 – and differs from intrinsic value in a 
number of ways. If we value music or art for an extrinsic value its value is likely to be obvious, and if 
we value it due to dependent or adherent beauty its value as an example of its kind should be clear, 
but, if we value something for its ‘free beauty’ this is when the reason for valuing it may be less 
obvious. 
 
All music appreciated as music, or all art appreciated as art is, as was acknowledged by Oscar Wilde 
in the Preface to A Picture of Dorian Gray, ‘quite useless’,74 and it is for this reason that the value of music 
as music or art as art can come into question.  
 
 
In his book A Theory of Art Karol Berger writes: 
 
‘The need to answer the question of art’s function becomes more acute as the 
autonomy of the artist grows […] Much of what today would be classified as art 
was produced to accompany, embellish, and enhance the public and private 
rituals and ceremonies of religious, political and social life […] But it is a defining 
feature of modern art that it is autonomous, that the goals of its producers are 
internal to the practices of the various arts themselves, and not imposed on them 
from without, It is precisely the autonomy of modern art that gives rise to the 
question of the function of art and makes the question so difficult to answer. Once 
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art has been emancipated from the context of social practices that gave it 
significance, what is its point? What is the function of functionless art?’75 
 
 
The point Berger makes here is that when art is valued for an extrinsic value – its ability to be 
functional– it is much easier to see the purpose of art, but because modern art is autonomous the 
question of its function is difficult to answer; however, being functionless does not necessarily have to 
mean being purposeless. In his article ‘Aesthetic Judgements, Artworks and Functional Beauty’, 
Stephen Davies discusses this subject, writing that: 
 
 
‘Sometimes art is described as lacking a practical function, which perhaps implies 
that it is useless and therefore worthless. A more accurate account attributes to art 
a distinctive function, which is to provide an aesthetically (or artistically) 
pleasurable experience when contemplated for its own sake […] the value of art is 
held to be intrinsic and self regarding’.76  
 
 
Art has a function distinctive to itself, and because of this, even when it ‘lacks practical utility’77 it can 
still be purposeful. According to Davies, the value of art and its aesthetic value lies in its ability to 
provide a pleasurable experience.  
 
The pleasurable experience that comes from engaging with art is central to our reasons for valuing art 
for art’s sake, which confirms that the value of art is located in our experience of it and our 
relationship with it. Davies’ claim that the value of art is held to be intrinsic and self regarding seems 
to me to be the only answer to the question of why we value aesthetic value. The aesthetic value of art, 
or the value of art as art, cannot be explained. We value beauty because it is beautiful, and we value 
things with aesthetic value because they have aesthetic value. Aesthetic value can be defined as the 
intrinsic and non-instrumental value of something, and it is for this reason that it is not possible to 
justify it rationally.   
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Chapter 3 - Changing Attitudes Towards Modernist  
Music   
 
Beauty and Value in Modernist Music 
 
Modernist music, it seems, is often considered as being without beauty or any particular value by 
people who lack the understanding or open-mindedness to appreciate it. In 2010 Alex Ross wrote an 
article entitled ‘Why do we hate modern classical music?’,78 which was published in The Guardian. In it 
Ross states that: ‘Avant garde art and architecture are loved, but in music we cling to the past. We’re 
missing out.’79 This differentiation between modern music and the other ‘modern arts’ is puzzling 
because music, although perhaps the most abstract of the arts,80 had, until relatively recently, enjoyed 
a status equal to that of other arts. Ross puts forward an interesting suggestion as to why this may be 
the case which highlights the different ways in which we interact with different art forms and may 
explain the difference in attitudes when it comes to embracing modernism across the art forms. He 
writes that ‘because concert audiences are essentially trapped in their seats for a set period, they tend 
to reject unfamiliar work more readily than do gallery visitors, who can move about freely, 
confronting strange images at their own pace.’81 This is a highly perceptive observation that may 
perhaps explain the disparity in attitudes towards modernist music and modernist art and 
architecture.  
 
When something is new to us it is often more comfortable to approach it on our own terms and at our 
own pace, and to know that we can escape if we wish. The thought of being ‘trapped’, as Ross puts it, 
for a prolonged period of time and being forced to listen to unfamiliar music may put many people 
off, however familiarisation with something can often have the effect of making us more comfortable 
with it – the mere exposure effect is an example of this. According to the mere exposure effect, people 
tend to develop a liking or preference for things simply because they are exposed to them and become 
familiar with them. If this theory is applied to modernist music then it can be surmised that people 
who ‘hate modern classical music’ would find – if they keep listening to it - that they don’t actually 
hate it at all.  As Ross writes, ‘All music is an acquired taste; no music is everywhere beloved’82, 	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however the thought of attending a concert of ‘modern classical music’ where they would be expected 
to stay and listen until the end may be unappealing or even intimidating to some people – people who 
have not experienced much exposure to this type of music before - and this prevents them from 
becoming familiar with it and appreciating it in the way they appreciate other modern art.  
 
In order to locate beauty in modernist music listeners must be able to relate to it, and if they are 
unable to do this it will be impossible for them to appreciate the intrinsic value of the work. This is one 
of the main struggles faced by modernist music. Modernism can alienate people, but it also has the 
power to touch people and has the ability to encourage free play of the imagination. The problem 
with determining the value of modernist music is that its intrinsic value lies in its beauty, meaning that 
if listeners are unable to connect with modernist music in such a way that they are sensible of the 
promise of beauty and the aesthetically pleasurable experience it has to offer they will be equally 
unable to see any value in it as art. 
 
Modernist works, which were at first reviled by many, later became important works in the 
mainstream canon of western art music. The Rite of Spring is one example of this. A question to ask 
ourselves is whether the reason for this is that people eventually recognised that they are beautiful, or 
if the canon of classical music was expanded to include works which are not beautiful. I believe that 
what happened was a combination of these two things, and that this came about because people grew 
more accustomed to modernist music - in so far as modernist music has been welcomed into the 
canon of classical music. The works of Berg are another example of this. Scruton refers to the operas 
of Berg and the novels of Zola as examples of successful aesthetic objects – or works of art – that 
succeeded despite not being beautiful in the idealised sense. He writes that: 
 
 
‘Even in Zola and Berg, however, beauty shows its face – as in the lovely invocation 
of the young Françoise and her cow at the opening of La Terre or the equally lovely 
music with which Berg’s orchestra sorrows over Lulu. Zola and Berg, in their 
different ways, remind us that real beauty can be found, even in what is seedy, 
painful and decayed. Our ability to tell the truth about our own condition in 
measured words and touching melodies, offers a kind of redemption from it.’83 
 
 
La Terre is a novel set in rural France and includes themes of immorality, lust, greed, jealously, death, 
violence and rape, however, in addition to telling the truth about our own condition, it includes 	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passages of highly descriptive and beautifully written prose.84 Beauty shows its face throughout this 
painful and seedy novel. In Lulu Berg addresses some themes similar to those found throughout La 
Terre, however, like Zola, Berg shows how beauty can be found in unexpected places. Schopenhauer, 
according to Wicks, believed that ‘the aesthetic representation of horrible subject matters is beneficial 
if it reveals those subjects sufficiently well to render their reality reprehensible’, however he found 
‘traditional artistic representations’ to be wanting in this respect because ‘they do not convey the full 
reality of the objects they portray.’85 Scruton’s claim that our ability to tell the truth about our own 
condition through art offers redemption from it is similar in a way to Schopenhauer’s feeling that 
representations of distasteful or uncomfortable subject matter can be beneficial if they represent it 
accurately enough to ‘render their reality reprehensible’. The main difference separating their 
thinking on this matter is that while the traditional artistic representations which Schopenhauer speaks 
of failed to achieve this, the modernist works which Scruton refers to successfully conveyed the ugly 
truth of our own condition. This is one other way in which La Terre and Lulu, and indeed modernist 
art in general, can be beautiful.  
 
Modernism can be beautiful and valuable through not being afraid to embrace the harshness and 
ugliness of reality, however the way in which it does this allows us to distance ourselves from it just 
enough to contemplate it freely and imaginatively. In Pyramids at the Louvre – Music, Culture and Collage 
from Stravinsky to the Postmodernists Glenn Watkins writes that ‘Marcel Proust purportedly once asked his 
housekeeper, “Do you ever read novels, Celeste?” “Occasionally, monsieur,” she replied. “Why?” he 
continued”. “They take me out of myself”, she responded; to which Proust retorted, “They should 
take you into yourself.”’86 This idea of novels being able to take you into yourself is not unlike that of 
using art to tell the truth about our own condition. In both examples a work is having the effect of 
making us turn inwards, either to look at society or at ourselves, at the same time as giving us pleasure. 
Modernist art and music gives us this opportunity, and its ability to do so, although it may be shocking 
or disturbing, is at the same time part of what makes it beautiful. 
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Modernism Becomes Familiar 
 
The difficulty of locating beauty in modernism is a relative thing because the newness and 
shockingness of modernism is something that is often greatly reduced with familiarisation. What was 
once uncomfortably new and modern, over time, may lose these qualities and become old and 
familiar. This can make it easier to appreciate the beauty in modernist art and music because when 
we become more comfortable and open around it we are more able, or willing, to engage in cognitive 
and imaginative free-play, to see purposiveness in the seemingly aimless, to accept that ‘real beauty 
can be found even in what is seedy, painful and decayed’ and perhaps even recognise elements of 
classical beauty in the modernist work.  
 
Taruskin described Debussy as the first modernist, and in his article ‘The Assault on Modernism in 
Music’, which was published in The Musical Quarterly in 1921, R.D. Welch acknowledges that the music 
of Debussy was at first seen as ‘strange, new sounds’, but he also writes that it wasn’t long before his 
[Debussy’s] name became ‘a symbol for the delicate and imaginative and suggestive in all modern 
art’.87 The change in attitudes that took place regarding Debussy’s compositions shows the way in 
which art that was at first not regarded as beautiful can, with time, come to be seen as beautiful – 
‘some beautiful things can seem, at first glance, quite imperfect’.88 For example, a listener hearing the 
music of Xenakis, Birtwistle or Berio for the first time may hear it as ‘strange new sounds’, but upon a 
second listening, or a third listening, they may find something new in it. Each time they return to the 
music they will learn to engage with it in a new and more meaningful way and will become more 
sensitive to its promise of beauty. What it is important to remember is that the music did not become 
beautiful - nothing in the music changed - the only thing that changed was the attitude towards it and 
the willingness of people to be open to the possibility of finding beauty in modernist music.  
 
A listener indicates that they find a piece of music beautiful and intrinsically valuable by returning to it 
and listening to it again and again, even though nothing new can be gained through this. It is valuable 
to them as an end in itself because even though there is nothing new that they hope to do with it they 
still wish to experience it again; it is through their actions that it can be seen that they value the work, 
and that the value they place on it is of an aesthetic nature. The same could be said of someone to 
wishes to look upon a modernist artwork even after they have seen it before. The viewer enjoys a 
pleasurable experience through simply looking upon the work of art, without any desire to do 
anything with it – they are appreciating it in a disinterested way and therefore valuing it only for its 	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aesthetic value. Although it may not be an image that is immediately beautiful, familiarity with it can 
make one grow to see more in it and experience more pleasure while looking at it. As I mentioned 
above, this is not the same as other recurring desires because at no point is the listener’s desire for the 
piece of music or the person’s desire for the artwork fully satiated; at no point will they find that they 
have experienced enough beauty and cease to desire it. 
 
When discussing how to encourage more people to engage with modern classical music Ross writes 
that ‘What must fall away is the notion of classical music as a reliable conduit for consoling beauty – a 
kind of spa treatment for tired souls. Such an attitude undercuts not only 20th-century composers but 
also the classics it purports to cherish.’89 The answer to the problem of helping people realise the value 
and beauty of modernist music may be to convince them to change their perceptions of what classical 
music should be like, and to broaden their views regarding beauty and what it consists in. 
Expectations of what music and art ought to be like, how they ought to make one feel and what 
beauty ought to look or sound like, I believe, are the main barriers for people when it come to locating 
beauty in modernism. 
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Conclusion           
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
Having now considered the ideas of beauty, value and modernism, I will to take some time to gather 
together the different strands of this argument and set them out before us.  
 
One of the questions I posed at the beginning of this dissertation was whether beauty can be located 
within modernist music and art, or if beauty as a central element in artistic creation and aesthetic 
appreciation is absent in modernist music and art. Throughout the course of this discussion I have 
kept that question at the forefront of my thinking. The emergence of modernism in music resulted in a 
new style of composition which bore little resemblance to the music of the past. Conventionally 
beautiful melodies and harmonies, and conventional structures and forms became unfashionable, and 
it seemed that beauty was no longer a feature of music. Composers adopted a new approach to music 
which saw them pushing boundaries and challenging listeners with new and unusual sounds, but did 
this really mark the end of beauty? Beauty, as it was most commonly recognised, may have become 
almost obsolete, but this does not necessarily have to mean that it vanished altogether.  
 
Modernism in music paralleled the rise of modernism in other art forms where beauty appeared to be 
cast aside as something that was no longer relevant or interesting. Artists were experimenting with 
new techniques and styles in the same way that composers of modernist music were doing, but in their 
attempts to develop their new style I don’t believe that beauty was truly lost. Braque’s comment 
stating that what he wished to do was create a new sort of beauty is key to understanding the way in 
which modernism developed. Braque said that what he aimed to do was to create a new type of 
beauty, not that he wanted to turn his back on beauty entirely. I believe that this was also the aim of 
other modernist artists and composers, for example Stravinsky, of whom I have already spoken. 
Modernist composers needn’t be seen as having abandoned beauty, which, according to Steiner, is the 
generous aim of aesthetic experience; however they did move in a different direction, creating a new 
path towards beauty and pleasurable aesthetic experiences. 
 
Beauty has been a subject of interest for many centuries, but in some ways little has changed in the 
way we think about it. Two opposing points of view – that of beauty as subjective and that of beauty 
as objective – dominate thinking, but I believe that it is possible to look beyond this divide and see that 
they are connected in some way. I believe that beauty is subjective and that it exists only within a 
subject’s experience of an object and the relationship between the two, however I also recognise that 
the objective qualities of something affect a subject’s experience of it and influence their relationship 
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with it, and, because this is the case, that the objective qualities of something can have an effect on 
whether or not someone finds it beautiful. Further to this, popular conceptions of what beauty is are 
often based on objective physical qualities of objects because we have been taught to identify certain 
traits as beautiful. As a society, we have become accustomed to a certain type of beauty, and because 
modernist music and art aren’t beautiful in this way it is difficult for people to see how they could be 
called beautiful. That being said, if we consider beauty in a fuller sense it becomes easier to 
understand the beauty that is located in modernism.  
 
Having established that beauty does not consist in the physical qualities of an object, the problem now 
is deciding what it is that makes something beautiful. Artistic beauty lies in an object’s ability to inspire 
free-play of the imagination and cognition, it is beauty born again of the mind and has a 
purposiveness which is not to do with any function. We know that we find something beautiful when 
we cannot see how it could be changed in any way but for the worse, and perhaps most significantly, 
we can’t understand how anyone could disagree with us. Beauty affects us in a certain way; it doesn’t 
matter how something looks or sounds, or whether it is classically beautiful or not, because beauty is 
much more than the physical qualities of an object. The beauty of modernist music  - the new type of 
beauty referred to by Braque and developed by modernists such as Stravinsky – is this sort of beauty. 
It is the sort of beauty that affects listeners, viewers and readers without them necessarily realising that 
what they are experiencing is beauty. Beauty can also be experienced through representations of 
subject matter that would not normally be considered beautiful because it has the ability to be in some 
way redemptive.  
 
From here, the next point to consider was what counts as modernist music since the term ‘modernist’ 
could be interpreted in different ways. The main preoccupations of modernism were experimentation 
and innovation. Modernist music was music which broke rules and moved away from the 
conventional music of the time; however, as modernism developed composers continued to push 
boundaries by experimenting further with harmony, atonality and rhythm, and so modernism became 
more extreme as time progressed. One of the things that modernism did was draw attention to the 
true condition of society, but it also proved that beauty can be found in unexpected places, for 
example in the seedy, the distorted, the painful, the shocking and the sorrowful. Modernist music is 
not a ‘reliable conduit for consoling beauty’ or a ‘spa treatment for tired souls’ because it, like other art 
forms, refuses to sooth us by gently glossing over the less attractive elements of ourselves and our 
nature, but, nonetheless, it is full of the promise of beauty. 
 
The concept of value was also of interest to me because beauty is inextricably linked with value, and, 
furthermore, because art can be seen as being ‘useless’ and purposeless, making it is easy to say that it 
has little or no value. When someone says that an object - be it a work of art, a piece of music or 
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anything else - is beautiful, they are also saying that they value it. The value of music as music or art as 
art is intrinsic and non-instrumental, and it is for this reason that it can be difficult to say why precisely 
it is valuable to us, and this can call into question whether it is of any value at all. If something has 
extrinsic value it can be useful to us in some way and therefore our reasons for valuing it are more 
obvious that if its only value is intrinsic and non-instrumental. The aesthetic value of an object is its 
intrinsic and non-instrumental value. 
 
All art, including music, can have many different values depending on who is valuing it and the way in 
which they perceive it, however, art appreciated for its aesthetic value has a function distinct to itself, 
which is to provide an aesthetically pleasurable experience. The value of art, therefore, lies in its 
ability to please us and provide us with pleasurable aesthetic experiences. Because modernist music is 
beautiful, and to be beautiful is to be valued, modernist music is also valuable.  
 
In answer to my earlier question, artistic creation, beauty and aesthetic appreciation and value go 
hand in hand with one another. Beauty has remained a central element of art, albeit a different sort of 
beauty from that which people have been used to. It is clear to me that beauty can be located within 
modernism, although modernist music and art may not always be obviously beautiful in the way in 
which people are used to. What it is important to remember is that ‘beauty’ is not an objective quality 
– at least, it is not truly an objective quality.  
 
 
One last question that still has to be addressed is why the subject of this thesis –the concept of beauty –
is relevant, or, to put it another way, why beauty matters. Does beauty still have any relevance in 
today’s society? 
 
Scruton writes that: 
 
‘Our need for beauty is not something that we could lack and still be fulfilled as 
people. It is a need arising from our metaphysical condition, as free individuals, 
seeking our place in a shared public world. We can wander through this world, 
alienated, resentful, full of suspicion and distrust. Or we can find ourselves at 
home here […] The experience of beauty guides us along this second path; it tells 
us that we are at home in the world, that the world is already ordered in our 
perceptions […] But – and this is again one of the messages of the early 
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modernists – beings like us become at home in the world only be acknowledging 
our ‘fallen’ condition, as Eliot acknowledged in The Waste Land…’90 
 
Beauty is still an important aspect of our lives, however the beauty that can be found in modernist 
music and art for many people remains overlooked and unappreciated. Modernism’s main 
achievement was creating a new sort of beauty, but the way in which we think about beauty may have 
to change if we are to appreciate it fully. 
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